tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1005467445991123227.post2724187162733319888..comments2023-10-29T05:58:45.931-07:00Comments on meaning is use: Searle, Kripke, and Quine's indeterminacy thesis (Part 1)Brian S. G. Blackwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04160594793816569665noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1005467445991123227.post-68576654793471930792008-02-17T22:03:00.000-08:002008-02-17T22:03:00.000-08:00I agree, Searle's response seems to be missing som...I agree, Searle's response seems to be missing something. I'll take a stab at explaining why. When translating, in the sense of Quine, from one language to another, you are just trying to preserve truth given linguistic behavior. There are lots of connections between words and sentences, connections I will call inferential. The inferential connections form a structure throughout the language. Translation can be taken as mapping one structure into another in a way that preserves as much that is relevant to truth as possible. Quine can map other people's inferential structures to his own in such a way that when they say "rabbit" their utterance gets mapped to "rabbit foot" in Quine's language. If Searle wants to know what he means by "rabbit" he has a mapping to his own inferential structure that maintains all of the structure, namely the identity map, which would send "rabbit" to "rabbit." I'm not sure if that delivers enough certainty though. There could be arcane translations from your language into your language that are not as tidy.Shawnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15244930958211791213noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1005467445991123227.post-21466161250317519832008-02-12T05:43:00.000-08:002008-02-12T05:43:00.000-08:00To Brandon Beasley - indeed. Is this a criticism o...To Brandon Beasley - indeed. Is this a criticism of Kripke, sir? ;-)<BR/><BR/>To Daniel Lindquist - I tend to read Quine as a contemporary heir to Hume. Perhaps the indeterminacy thesis is not a sceptical argument as such, but it has the flavor of Humean scepticism about it (e.g. demolishing a philosophical notion to which we are deeply attached, and replacing it with something that feels a little impoverished by comparison).Brian S. G. Blackwellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04160594793816569665noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1005467445991123227.post-51339317680342896702008-02-12T00:03:00.000-08:002008-02-12T00:03:00.000-08:00It doesn't strike me as right to describe the inde...It doesn't strike me as right to describe the indeterminacy of translation as a "skeptical argument"; I think Davidson is right that it's a trivial doctrine, analogous to measuring the temperature in Kelvin or degrees Fahrenheit. But I'll wait for the follow-up before saying any more.Daniel Lindquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05443116324301716578noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1005467445991123227.post-72925120688243151622008-02-11T12:08:00.000-08:002008-02-11T12:08:00.000-08:00I'm not sure that Kripke's book on Wittgenstein br...I'm not sure that Kripke's book on Wittgenstein brilliantly shows anything except his complete and utter lack of understanding of the Philosophical Investigations. ;)Brandon E. Beasleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13360866712943169976noreply@blogger.com