tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1005467445991123227.post395331720050038506..comments2023-10-29T05:58:45.931-07:00Comments on meaning is use: Fodor and LePore vs. BrandomsteinBrian S. G. Blackwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04160594793816569665noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1005467445991123227.post-6708272567025735832020-11-20T15:35:42.744-08:002020-11-20T15:35:42.744-08:00Nice Blog Verry Good
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.......Nice Blog Verry Good <br />...<a href="https://goblok-1.blogspot.com" rel="nofollow">.</a>...<br />...<a href="https://goblok-2.blogspot.com" rel="nofollow">.</a>...<br />...<a href="https://goblok-3.blogspot.com" rel="nofollow">.</a>...<br />...<a href="https://goblok-4.blogspot.com" rel="nofollow">.</a>...<br />...<a href="https://goblok-5.blogspot.com" rel="nofollow">.</a>...<br />...<a href="https://goblok-6.blogspot.com" rel="nofollow">.</a>...<br />...<a href="https://goblok-7.blogspot.com" rel="nofollow">.</a>...Jasa Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00564545861420278602noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1005467445991123227.post-56711975991208617372008-05-25T16:16:00.000-07:002008-05-25T16:16:00.000-07:00"...a stumbling block for those who would like to ..."...a stumbling block for those who would like to incorporate Wittgensteinian ideas into a systematic theory: namely, how can we bridge the apparent gulf between mere habituation and genuine normativity?"<BR/><BR/>I focus on your reduction of the issue at hand. While one might say with you that this is a stumbling point of anyone trying to systematize Wittgenstein, this seems more a stumbling point for anyone, anywhere, for I know of no originary explanation for this difference, under any theory. <BR/><BR/>Or is that you find that other theories do not share this problem, that this is particular to Wittgensteinian investigation? Classical Latin authors of rhetoric regarded this difference simply as the "ingenium" capacities of a person, their in-born genius, so to speak. It shows itself in how one is able to break rules, and not just merely following, and to do so productively. If anything, Wittgenstein taught us that there is not rule for how to follow a rule. If this is understood, even further, there is not rule for how to break rules either. Rather, there is just the experience of cohesion, and the experience of the expansion of a purview. Habituation simply does not involve the concrete awareness of this possibility, the intentional variation on theme. It does not include the possibility of saying, as I believe Rorty marks out the essential linguistic act, "Those look like an X, but they are really a Y". The content of such a form cannot be habituated.<BR/><BR/>What I believe keeps creativity (whose possibility is implicit "genuine normativity") afloat over and above habituation, is the cashed-out-payment of reading behaviors as rule breaking in a productive sense. When rules are broken productively, there is the pay off for seeing things along new vectors. Much as in the conditions which govern intentional attributions, "genuine normativity" is an attribution, and not something one does. One might very well discover that what you thought was "genuine normativity" (I would say creative normativity) suddenly was only parroted habituation. (A brilliant thought offered by an intellectual happens to just be a paraphrase of someone else.) The simpler and more modest attribution actually does the best work at getting out what is meaningful in that behavior. In the same way, actions assumed to be intentional, may prove to be merely body actions, by context. What Wittgenstein tells us, I think, is that no matter how much you systemify, you will find no "object" or even "process" to which such a difference corresponds. It is much like his treatment of "understands" in PI.<BR/><BR/>Just a thought.<BR/><BR/><BR/>kvond<BR/>http://kvond.wordpress.com/kvondhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07709562524431261018noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1005467445991123227.post-2127607584571788922008-03-19T17:32:00.000-07:002008-03-19T17:32:00.000-07:00where are you going to gradschool next year?where are you going to gradschool next year?daimonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10861366825688307693noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1005467445991123227.post-22405883604803896442008-03-14T19:58:00.000-07:002008-03-14T19:58:00.000-07:00If you plan to read Brandom then you might want to...If you plan to read Brandom then you might want to start with Articulating Reasons which is less daunting than Making It Explicit, on account of size mainly, and yet provides a very good introduction to Brandom's inferentialism.Pierre-Normandhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14850296423954445470noreply@blogger.com